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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court case of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of California,1 decided eighteen years ago,
produced arguably the sloppiest First Amendment analysis in modern
times. The case dealt the consumer movement a severe blow,2 but only
three Justices who participated in the decision remain on the Court, and
* Visiting Professor of Law, Williams College; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985.
** Consumer advocate and founder of several citizen organizations. A.B.,
Princeton University, 1955; LL.B., Harvard University, 1958.
1. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
2. Prior to the decision, there was a growing nationwide movement to create
citizen utility boards. See Michael de Courcy Hinds, Citizen Utility Boards Hunt Industry
White Elephants, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1982, at 8BE. The decision devastated that movement.
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two of them dissented.3 This combination of circumstances suggests the
value of revisiting the Court opinion.4
The case involved a state-regulated utility, the Pacific Gas & Electric
Company (PG&E). For many years, PG&E distributed a newsletter in its
monthly billing statements containing assorted information of practical
value to the company’s customers, such as tips on conservation and
information about bills and services, as well as political editorials and
news stories.5 In a ratemaking procedure before the California Public
Utilities Commission (Commission), which regulates PG&E, a group
called Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) argued that ratepayers
should not be forced to bear the expense of PG&E’s political speech.6
TURN urged the Commission to forbid PG&E from using billing
envelopes to distribute political editorials.7 Instead, the Commission chose
a different remedy—permitting TURN to insert its own materials into
the mailing, four times a year, in order to raise funds and communicate
with ratepayers.8 TURN was required to display a bold statement that its
message was not that of PG&E.9
PG&E brought suit, asserting that the Commission’s order violated
PG&E’s First Amendment right not to help spread a message with which
it disagreed.10 After the California Supreme Court denied discretionary
review of the order, the United States Supreme Court heard the case and
held that the mandatory insert was unconstitutional.11
This Article argues that the Court’s opinion was flawed in various
respects, especially in applying the First Amendment right not to speak
to a commercial corporation. Such a holding has no grounding in any
valid policy and does not follow from the Court’s stated rationale for
protecting corporate speech. Indeed, the Court’s misguided analysis
undercuts core First Amendment interests.
3. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens (along with Justice White) dissented. Of the
Justices in the majority, only Justice O’Connor remains on the Court. Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 475 U.S. at 2.
4. See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977)
(noting that despite the principle of stare decisis, the need to straighten out muddled law
that produces harmful consequences justifies reconsideration of Court precedent).
5. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 5.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 5–6. The Commission found that the envelope space used to disseminate
the newsletter was property of the ratepayers, and there was “extra space” in the
newsletter. Id. at 6. “Extra space” was defined as follows: “‘the space remaining in the
billing envelope, after inclusion of the monthly bill and any required legal notices, for
inclusion of other materials up to such total envelope weight as would not result in any
additional postage cost.’” Id. (quoting the Commission’s opinion).
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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II. THE CORPORATE CONSCIENCE
The Court found that the Commission order mandating a TURN insert
in PG&E’s mailings “impermissibly requires appellant to associate with
speech with which appellant may disagree.”12 Appellant “may be forced
either to appear to agree with TURN’S views or to respond,”13 and the
required disclaimer on TURN’s message “does nothing to reduce the
risk that appellant will be forced to respond when there is strong
disagreement with the substance of TURN’s message.”14
One might think that TURN’s message, coupled with the predicted
response by PG&E, would promote a robust debate and thus further First
Amendment values, but the Court saw another First Amendment value
trampled in the process. Here is the heart of its analysis, replete with
revealing case citations:
That kind of forced response is antithetical to the free discussion that the First
Amendment seeks to foster. [Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)]. See also Wooley v. Maynard, [430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977)]. For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within
it the choice of what not to say. [Miami Hearld Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974)]. And we have held that speech does not lose its protection
because of the corporate identity of the speaker. [First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)]; [Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980)]. The danger that appellant will be
required to alter its own message as a consequence of the government’s
coercive action is a proper object of First Amendment solicitude, because the
message itself is protected under our decisions in Bellotti and Consolidated
Edison.15

This analysis clearly conflates different aspects of the First Amendment.
The First Amendment serves two essential purposes—what might
crudely be called its public purpose and its private purpose.16 The First
Amendment serves the public by promoting the kind of vigorous debate
about public issues necessary for a vibrant democracy.17 In addition, the
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. (citation omitted).
14. Id. at 15 n.11.
15. Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
16. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)
(noting “the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression [and]
also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination
of information and ideas”) (footnote omitted).
17. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting the First
Amendment’s role in serving the “profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
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First Amendment protects individuals’ interests in privacy, expression,
and growth.18 Sometimes, the protection of free speech serves both
goals simultaneously, but other times it does not.19 The two goals are
analytically distinct20 and the Court usually treats them that way. Thus,
for example, when the Court affirmed the right to possess pornographic
materials in one’s home, it did not contend that doing so would enrich
public debate.21 Conversely, when the Court protected the publication of
the Pentagon Papers, it made no claim that it did so to promote the
interests of individuals.22
Unfortunately, in the passage from Pacific Gas quoted above, the
Court mixed the private and public aspects of the First Amendment. The
Court observed that corporations retain free speech rights, but failed to
note the explicit rationale for that doctrine (as set forth in the very cases
the Court cited—Bellotti and Consolidated Edison): to promote public
debate.23 The Court haphazardly intermingled its assertion of a
corporation’s right to speak with a more specific First Amendment
right—protection from coerced association. The latter right, however,
was developed in cases unrelated to corporate speech and for reasons
unrelated to promoting public debate.24 Protection from coerced speech
and association derives from the other principal First Amendment
rationale—protection of individuals. Specifically, it protects individual
autonomy and conscience, or what some commentators have called
“personhood”25 or “self-realization.”26 The paradigmatic cases, explicitly
18. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 787
(2d ed. 1988) (noting the First Amendment’s role in promoting and protecting “personal
growth and self-realization”) (footnote omitted).
19. See Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Comment, Exposing the Stealth Candidate:
Disclosure Statutes After McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1211, 1232 (1996) (“Often the self-governance conception collides with the First
Amendment’s goal of protecting self-expression.”).
20. See Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 761
(1995) (“[The] two [First Amendment] values are differently situated with respect to
different kinds of speech; applying both elements to all forms of speech is mistaken.”).
21. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
22. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
23. See Nicholas Nesgos, Note, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission: The Right to Hear in Corporate Negative and Affirmative Speech, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1095 (1988) (“A more fundamental flaw in the plurality’s
decision was its failure to take account of the differences between the first amendment
rights of corporations as distinguished from individuals.”).
24. Significantly, in the cases affirming a corporate right to free speech, the Court
explicitly acknowledged that this right does not stem from any interest in selfexpression. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 & n.12 (1978);
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980).
25. See TRIBE, supra note 18, § 15-4, at 1312–14.
26. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1982).
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relied on by the Court in Pacific Gas, are West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette27 and Wooley v. Maynard.28 In Barnette and
Wooley, respectively, the Court struck down a statute requiring a
compulsory flag salute29 and a statute requiring the compulsory display
of the New Hampshire’s state slogan, “Live free or die,” on license
plates.30 In these cases, the Court sought to protect “the sphere of
intellect and spirit”31 and “individual freedom of mind.”32
The profound differences between those cases and Pacific Gas should
be apparent. In Barnette, the state required individuals to speak a
message that violated their consciences. In Pacific Gas, the state merely
required a corporation to share envelope space with the offending
message.33 Both Barnette and Wooley protected against the state’s
coercing citizens to voice an officially prescribed orthodoxy.34 In
Pacific Gas, no such coercion took place; a corporation was merely
forced to compete in the marketplace of ideas with a public interest
group.35 In Barnette and Wooley the state imposed “[c]ompulsory
unification of opinion,”36 whereas in Pacific Gas the state sought to
achieve diversity of opinion. Barnette and Wooley protected “intellectual
individualism,”37 whereas Pacific Gas did nothing of the sort. Barnette
and Wooley involved a daily affirmation of a state-mandated message,
“in a manner akin to brainwashing, to suppress individual initiative and

27. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
29. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
30. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706–07, 717.
31. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
32. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
33. See Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson’s Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court
Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817, 822 (1986) (noting
that the Barnette Court recognized “the right to be free of government efforts to force
individuals to say what they do not believe”).
34. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.”).
35. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (rejecting application of Wooley and Barnette to university student activity
funding mechanism because, although the latter forced people to subsidize speech with
which they disagreed, it did not “require an individual to bear an offensive statement
personally . . . let alone to affirm a moral or political commitment”).
36. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
37. Id.
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to bring individual thought into line with the state’s chosen ideology.”38
Once again, nothing like this transpired in Pacific Gas. No government
message or official ideology was at issue, nor was anyone compelled to
say anything.39
Barnette and Wooley are flimsy precedent for protecting a for-profit
utility from sharing envelope space with a group that represents
ratepayers. Not only is the spirit-intellect-mind rationale inapposite in
the Pacific Gas case,40 but a bold disclaimer (not readily available in the
other cases) solves any problem of coerced association.41
Nevertheless, in Pacific Gas the Court randomly applied the “freedom
of conscience” rationale to corporations.42 The Court ignored Justice
Rehnquist’s powerful contention, in dissent: “Extension of the individual
freedom of conscience decisions to business corporations strains the
rationale of those cases beyond the breaking point.”43 As Rehnquist
explains: “To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for
freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.”44
It gets worse. In this case, importing the freedom of conscience into a
situation where it did not plausibly apply defeated the rationale for
protecting corporate speech in the first place—the promotion of public
debate.45 The Court’s ruling prevented the kind of public give and take
38. Harpaz, supra note 33, at 851.
39. Indeed, Justice Marshall, whose separate concurrence gave the Court its fifth
vote, acknowledged that “interference with appellant’s speech is, concededly, very
slight.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 24 (1986) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
40. It should be obvious that requiring an individual to salute a flag that represents
something he may despise is a far cry from requiring a public utility to provide space for
a pro-ratepayer message it might dispute or find threatening to its profits.
41. The importance of the availability of a disclaimer was recognized by the Court
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980). Because the owner of
a shopping mall was free to post disclaimers disavowing any connection to the message
of specific speakers, his First Amendment rights were not violated by California’s
requirement that there be a right of access to the mall for the purpose of speech and
petitioning. PruneYard is discussed infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. See also
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
[T]here appears little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast
stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the
cable operator . . . and it is a common practice for broadcasters to disclaim any
identity of viewpoint between the management and the speakers who use the
broadcast facility.
Id. (citations omitted). In Pacific Gas, the party required to yield access (PG&E) did not
even need to make a disclaimer; TURN was required to state that its message did not
reflect the views of PG&E. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 6–7.
42. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 32–33 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 33.
44. Id.; see also Bezanson, supra note 20, at 739; (“[A corporation’s speech] is an
artifact. It has nothing to do with liberty and no necessary relationship to freedom, a
term that is meaningless outside the context of individuals.”).
45. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The
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(in PG&E’s newsletter) that allegedly underlies the extension of free
speech to corporations.46
What makes the case particularly unsettling is its disconnectedness to
opinions past and future.47 As Justice Rehnquist observed, two constitutional
rights closely analogous to the right to refrain from speaking—the right
to remain silent and the right to privacy—“have been denied to
corporations based on their corporate status.”48 In revealing dicta years
after Pacific Gas was decided, the Court unself-consciously described
the right not to speak as preventing “government control over the
content of messages expressed by private individuals.”49
Is there any valid precedent for the Pacific Gas decision? One case
cited by the Court at least superficially offers support. In Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,50 the Court did protect a corporation’s right
not to speak. The Court struck down a state statute requiring newspapers to
provide space for public officials to reply to attacks. The Court argued
that the statute endangered a free press because its effect would be to
penalize newspapers for exercising their speech rights by forcing them to
devote space they might not wish to devote.51
Although the Court in Pacific Gas leaned heavily on Tornillo, the
cases are radically different. First, in Pacific Gas, speech by PG&E
exacted no penalty: TURN would be given access to four envelopes
regardless of what PG&E said.52 Second, and related, the Court’s
prediction that PG&E would repress speech to head off a response was
farfetched.53 In Tornillo, the scenario of self-censorship was predictable;
right of access here constitutes an effort to facilitate and enlarge public discussion; it
therefore furthers rather than abridges First Amendment values.”); Nesgos, supra note
23, at 1096 (“[T]he listener’s right to hear should not protect corporate speech that itself
impedes the public’s ability to receive diverse views.”); Bezanson, supra note 20, at 739
(“Institutional speech, therefore, should be protected by a separate and distinct framework
of principle resting expressly on its value.”).
46. The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 189
(1986) (stating that the Court “erred by unthinkingly extending its instrumental protection
of corporate speech to encompass a case in which public debate was not really threatened
by the commission’s order” and that “[r]ather than protecting public debate . . . the Court
clearly restricted the flow of information”).
47. See id. at 182 (“[T]he Court . . . departed considerably from its historic
rationale for protecting corporate speech.”).
48. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 34.
49. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (emphasis added).
50. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
51. Id. at 256–57.
52. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 6–7.
53. Id. at 31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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a newspaper might well refrain from attacking an official, knowing that
it would be obliged to publish his reply.54 The editors might refuse the
point-counterpoint either because they did not wish to give the official a
forum or because they did not wish to devote that much space to the
matter.55 Neither rationale applied in Pacific Gas. TURN would be free
to say what it wanted regardless of what PG&E said or did not say, and
space was simply not a consideration because TURN’s inserts did not
increase the cost of mailings.56 Thus, the risk of self-censorship rested
solely on the slim possibility that, by raising a certain issue, PG&E
would call TURN’s attention to an issue it otherwise might ignore.57
Third, and most importantly, Tornillo involved a newspaper whose
very existence lies at the heart of the First Amendment.58 The Court
itself saw its decision as preventing “intrusion into the function of
editors.”59 To require a newspaper to publish something is a risky
incursion into public debate.60 As noted, a predictable response would
be for the newspaper, on some occasions, to withhold saying something
rather than give a public official the opportunity to respond. This, in
turn, would deprive the public of core political speech.61 By contrast, if
a utility is cowed into silence by the prospect of rebuttal from a
ratepayer protection group, comparatively little is lost.62 Indeed, as
54. Id. at 9–10.
55. Indeed, the Court explicitly cited the statute’s effect on editors’ allocations of
scarce newspaper space. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 n.22, 258.
56. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 5–6.
57. See id. at 31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality said “the
possibility of minimizing the undesirable content of TURN’s speech may induce PG&E
to adopt a strategy of avoiding certain topics,” but observing that “this is an extremely
implausible prediction”); see also Nesgos, supra note 23, at 1095 (“The utility could not
stop TURN from writing on particular subjects by not mentioning them in [its
newsletter]. . . . At most, by refraining from a particular topic the utility might avoid
suggesting a subject to its competing speaker.”) (footnote omitted).
58. See Bruce W. Blakely, Public Utility Bill Inserts, Political Speech, and the
First Amendment: A Constitutionally Mandated Right to Reply, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1221,
1257 (1982) (“The print media has historically been granted an independence from
government that does not extend to other information sources.”).
59. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
60. Indeed, government control of the media is an almost universal characteristic
of authoritarian regimes.
61. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Corporations
generally have not played the historic role of newspapers as conveyers of individual
ideas and opinion.”); see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797
n.1 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“It may be that a nonmedia corporation, because
of its nature, is subject to more limitations on political expression than a media
corporation whose very existence is aimed at political expression.”).
62. See Blakely, supra note 58, at 1258 (“[S]ince utilities are not engaged in the
business of informing the public, as are the media, the policy concerns that require media
independence from government (so that the media can perform their job of informing the
public and guarding against governmental abuse), do not apply to utilities.”).
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noted, TURN could say whatever it wants because all that is lost is a
commercial corporation’s self-serving commentary.
Also, the freedom of conscience-spirit rationale, developed in Barnette
and Wooley, could be extended to Tornillo with some plausibility. The
raison d’etre of many newspapers involves the expression of certain
perspectives or ideas.63 Moreover, newspapers are sometimes closely
linked in the public mind to one or a few individuals—the editor or
publisher.64 Such individuals sometimes start a newspaper precisely to
correct what they perceive as an imbalance in coverage. Requiring them
to give access to certain parties or viewpoints, therefore, might
undermine the very purpose of their enterprise.65
In short, there is an enormous difference between the right of a
newspaper to publish what it wants and the alleged right of a commercial
corporation to promote publication of what it wants.66 As Justice Rehnquist
aptly put it: “The insistence on treating identically for constitutional
purposes entities that are demonstrably different is as great a jurisprudential
sin as treating differently those entities which are the same.”67
It does not follow that newspapers are the only organizations to which
a right of conscience might plausibly be imputed. There are various
organizations, such as labor unions and political action committees, that
63. As an empirical matter, a newspaper is not a profit-making enterprise in the
same way a utility almost invariably is. One rarely starts a utility to promote a certain
viewpoint, and one often starts a newspaper for precisely that reason and with little
expectation of profit.
64. See C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 36–37 (1976) (noting that corporate speech should be
protected only when it represents “the personal values of the owners or stockholders” or
expresses management’s “personal prejudices or values”). Of course, where that is the
case, management and shareholders can and should speak for themselves. In general, it
seems safe to say that most corporate speech is directed at profit-making rather than
expressing a political perspective. See id. at 6 n.25.
65. One may respond that requiring a utility to provide space for the ratepayer
group will, in effect, undermine the utility’s purpose of maximizing profit, but such a
response acknowledges that the interest protected is not a First Amendment interest at
all. See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 67 (1996) (“[PG&E’s] economic loss
is of no constitutional significance, however, certainly not under the First Amendment.”).
The state can directly reduce the profit of a legally protected monopoly, and it is surely
far less inimical to the utility’s interests when the state requires the dissemination of
information that might reduce the utility’s profit.
66. Indeed, in a subsequent case the Court characterized the “essential proposition” of
Tornillo as follows: “The First Amendment protects the editorial independence of the
press.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653 (1994).
67. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 35 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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people join to enhance their voices or otherwise express themselves.68 If
such groups assume the corporate form, one need not disqualify them
from full First Amendment protection,69 but these should be the
exceptions, not the norm,70 and are readily distinguishable from a forprofit utility company.
III. THE DISCOUNTED DISCLAIMER
The Court’s failure to distinguish Tornillo was no more strained than
its attempt to differentiate PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.71 The
Court felt an understandable need to distinguish PruneYard, which had
been decided just six years earlier.72 In that case, the owner of a
shopping center wished to deny access to a group of students who sought
to distribute pamphlets in the center’s common area.73 The Court held
that the owner had no such right.74
Like the utility in Pacific Gas, the shopping center owner could have
seen dissemination on his premises of messages with which he disagreed
as a violation of his First Amendment rights, but the Court rejected the
owner’s claimed First Amendment right, in part, because he was free to
disavow any messages he disapproved of by posting a disclaimer.75 The
Court distinguished Barnette on that very ground, as well as the related
fact that the right of access did not compel the shopping center owner to

68. Such groups are typically not-for-profit, which provides a relatively easy basis
of distinguishing them from utilities like PG&E.
69. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 808 n.8 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting) (“[N]ewspapers and other forms of literature obviously do not lose
their First Amendment protection simply because they are produced or distributed by
corporations.”); Bezanson, supra note 20, at 822 (“Sometimes, of course, speech produced by
organizations will trace its value to the dissemination of the views of individuals—the
amplification, in effect, of the freedom of individuals to speak. If this is so, it is best
understood as individual speech, not institutional speech.”) (footnote omitted).
70. See Bezanson, supra note 20, at 822–23 (“In most cases, however, the speech
of organizations is not traceable to the expressive intentions of the members who
comprise them. . . . In such cases, the human concept of freedom has no bearing on the
reasons that might support protecting the speech.”).
71. 447 U.S. 74, 87–88 (1980).
72. See William Burnett Harvey, Private Restraint of Expressive Freedom: A PostPruneYard Assessment, 69 B.U. L. REV. 929, 933 (1989) (noting that PruneYard was a
“crucial step” in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence).
73. The right to access had been established by the California Supreme Court’s
interpretation of its state constitution. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341
(1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
74. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 88.
75. See id. at 87 (“[A]ppellants can expressly disavow any connection with the
message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand.
Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could
explain that the persons are communicating their own messages by virtue of state law.”).
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affirm his belief in government orthodoxy.76
In his Pacific Gas dissent, Justice Rehnquist rightly called PruneYard
and Pacific Gas “very similar.”77 The plurality in Pacific Gas did not
acknowledge the similarity.78 Instead, it offered dubious distinctions between
the two cases. First, the Court observed: “Notably absent from PruneYard
was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center
owner’s exercise of his own right to speak: the owner did not even allege
that he objected to the content of the pamphlets.”79 Oddly, the Court
implied that PruneYard turned on poor argumentation by counsel for the
shopping center owner, who apparently neglected to mention the obvious
fact that California’s right of access would result in the dissemination of
some messages with which the owner disagreed. If the Court’s analysis
above is taken at face value, PruneYard stands for a remarkably slender
proposition: The California right of access trumps a shopping center
owner’s right to exclude messages that he finds unacceptable.
The Court also observed that, in PruneYard, unlike in Pacific Gas, the
claimed access right was not “content-based,”80 but that is a distinction
without a difference as far as the shopping center owner was concerned.
Just like the utility in Pacfic Gas, the shopping owner was forced by a
government decree to assist in disseminating messages he would rather
not disseminate (and, in some cases, no doubt, with which he disagreed).81
In PruneYard, the Court found that the state interest in promoting
debate, and the availability of a disclaimer by the owner, sufficed to
justify the imposition.82 In Pacific Gas, it held otherwise. The factual
76. Id. at 88 (“Barnette is inapposite because it involved the compelled recitation
of a message containing an affirmation of belief. . . . Appellants are not similarly being
compelled to affirm their belief in any governmentally prescribed position or view.”).
77. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 28 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
78. Justice Marshall, in concurrence, did concede a “similarity” between the cases.
Id. at 22. (Marshall, J., concurring). His effort to distinguish them is discussed infra
notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
79. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 12.
80. Id.
81. The speech in question in PruneYard involved a United Nations resolution
against Zionism. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 77. While there is no indication
whether the store owner did in fact agree with the message promulgated by the speakers,
this is clearly the kind of controversial speech that some people would find offensive.
Inevitably, the owner of the shopping center would be helping to display some messages
with which he disagreed.
82. See id. at 85 n.8 (noting that the California Supreme Court could legitimately
conclude that the “access to appellants’ property in the manner required here is necessary
to the promotion of state-protected rights of free speech and petition”).
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differences between the two cases do not justify the different outcomes.83
The Court’s strained distinction of PruneYard culminated in an insecure
double negative: “PruneYard thus does not undercut the proposition that
forced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible.”84
Surely, PruneYard established that some forced associations do not
burden protected speech in an impermissible manner.85 The Court failed
to explain why what was permissible in PruneYard was impermissible in
Pacific Gas.
Justice Marshall was apparently troubled by the Court’s distinction of
PruneYard because he wrote a separate concurrence solely to attempt a
stronger distinction. He explained the “[t]wo significant differences”86
between the grants of access in PruneYard and Pacific Gas. The first
was that the right of access in PruneYard “did not permit a markedly
greater intrusion onto the property than that which the owner had
voluntarily encouraged, nor did it impair the commercial value of the
property.”87
This alleged difference has two component parts: (1) Distributing
pamphlets is not much more intrusive than shopping, and (2) it will not
reduce the owner’s profits. These are empirical claims, and it seems fair
to suggest that the owner was in a better position to judge each claim
than was Justice Marshall. The owner obviously felt that the distribution
of pamphlets was intrusive or bad for business.88 With respect to the
latter claim in particular, one wonders how Justice Marshall could know
whether the presence of pamphleteering would discourage prospective
shoppers.89 A stronger foundation for PruneYard is the public interest in
83. This would include one other factual distinction that the Court in Pacific Gas
cited, half-heartedly, in a footnote: “In addition, the relevant forum in PruneYard was the
open area of the shopping center into which the general public was invited. This area
was, almost by definition, peculiarly public in nature. . . . There is no correspondingly
public aspect to appellant’s billing envelopes.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 12 n.8
(citations omitted). In reality, a shopping center consists of stores and a parking lot. It is
not inherently public or private. If it becomes public, it does so by virtue of the actions
of various actors, including the owner, the legislature, and the courts. The owner in
PruneYard sought to keep his property somewhat private. His efforts failed because of
legislative and judicial determinations about the value of a robust debate contemplated
by the First Amendment.
84. Id. at 12.
85. See R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755, 799
(1999) (stating that PruneYard limits the reach of the argument against forced association).
86. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 22 (Marshall, J., concurring).
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Indeed, in PruneYard itself the Court acknowledged that the right of access
“interfere[d] with [the] commercial functions” of the shopping center, though it opined
that the owner could minimize these by time, place, and manner regulations. PruneYard,
447 U.S. at 83.
89. See infra note 108 (discussing the inappropriateness of courts making empirical
guesses).
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a robust debate outweighing minor harm to an entrepreneur’s bottom
line—a rationale that surely applies in Pacific Gas.
Justice Marshall observed that shopping centers, like parks and streets,
are places where much public activity already takes place, and “[a]dding
speech to the list of those activities did not in any great way change the
complexion of the property.”90 However, “[t]he same is not true in this
case.”91 To say no more, Justice Marshall was here engaged in the dubious
task of protecting the integrity (or “complexion”) of an envelope.92
Justice Marshall’s second distinction of PruneYard is no more convincing.
He claimed that the shopping center owner’s speech was in no way
hindered, whereas “[b]y appropriating, four times a year, the space in
appellant’s envelope that appellant would otherwise use for its own
speech, the State has necessarily curtailed appellant’s use of its own
forum.”93 Just two sentences later, Justice Marshall says that “the interference
with appellant’s speech is, concededly, very slight.”94 So what he
heralded as a “significant difference” between PruneYard and Pacific
Gas turns out, a few short paragraphs later, to rest on a “very slight”
interference with free speech rights.95 It is well settled that a strong
governmental interest can trump a tiny individual interest.96
The Court’s treatment of Tornillo and PruneYard, taken together,
suggests the bankruptcy of its opinion.97 The utility company bears a far
90. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 23 (Marshall, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. This concern for the dignity of an envelope, like the plurality’s attribution of
conscience to a for-profit corporation, is part of a bizarre pattern in which the Court
ascribes human qualities to nonhuman entities. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
748–49 (1999) (protecting the “dignity” of states).
93. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 24 (Marshall, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. Justice Marshall went on to argue that even such a slight interference cannot be
permitted in light of what he characterized as the state’s justification—“subsidization of
another speaker chosen by the State.” Id. That, in fact, was the state’s means, not its
justification. Its justification was to promote a fairer ratemaking process and richer
debate. Later in his opinion, Justice Marshall acknowledged as much, but claimed that
the means chosen by the state were insufficiently tailored to those ends. Id. at 25; see
infra notes 107–108 and accompanying text (discussing the means compared to the ends
issue).
96. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 500–01 n.* (1975) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (noting the “now-familiar process of balancing and accommodating First
Amendment freedoms with state or individual interests”).
97. Less central, but equally indefensible, is the Court’s treatment of Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), in which the Court struck down a state
statute permitting an agency shop arrangement whereby all employees represented by a
labor union, even nonunion members, had to contribute to the union as a condition of
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greater resemblance to a shopping center owner than to a newspaper,98
but the Court distinguished it from the latter and likened it to the former.99
IV. THE STATE INTEREST
The Court acknowledged in Pacific Gas that, notwithstanding any
burden on protected speech, the Commission’s order would be valid if it
served a compelling state interest.100 The Court further seemed to
acknowledge that the two proffered state interests—providing “fair and
employment. Id. at 209, 241–42. In Pacific Gas, the Court cited Abood for the
proposition that “the State is not free either to restrict appellant’s speech to certain topics
or views or to force appellant to respond to views that others may hold.” Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 11–12. This refers to the fact that, in Abood, the Court rejected the
idea that the forced contribution was acceptable because the nonunion member was free
to deduct from his fee the costs of specific union activity that he opposed. However, the
Court did so because, first, it was unfair to “place on each employee the considerable
burden of monitoring all of the numerous and shifting expenditures made by the Union,”
Abood, 431 U.S. at 241, and second, objecting to specific expenditures might subject him
to economic reprisal or physical coercion. Id. at 241 n.42. To apply these concerns to
the situation in Pacific Gas involves an enormous stretch. “Monitoring” TURN’s speech
merely required reading the inserts that appeared in PG&E’s own envelopes, and the
corporation had no ground to fear any reprisals or coercion. In Abood, the Court
protected David (a dissident employee) from Goliath (a powerful union). In Pacific Gas,
the Court protected a powerful corporation that needed no such protection.
98. In this connection, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Pacific Gas, made a
noteworthy observation:
The messages that the utility disseminates in its newsletter are unquestionably
intended to advance the corporation’s commercial interests, and its objections
to the public interest group’s messages are based on their potentially adverse
impact on the utility’s ability to obtain rate increases. These commercial
factors do not justify an abridgment of the utility’s constitutionally protected
right to communicate in its newsletter, but they do provide a legitimate and an
adequate justification for the Commission’s action in giving TURN access to
the same audience that receives the utility’s newsletter.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 39 n.8. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens’s observation
usefully reminds us that while some of PG&E’s speech in its newsletters may have been
somewhat political, both the speech itself and, more importantly, PG&E’s objections to
TURN’s access, were commercially motivated. Although Stevens did not make this
point, PG&E’s profit motive undercuts its improbable claim of a right to conscience—
PG&E pursued economic growth, not personal growth.
99. In PruneYard itself, if not in Pacific Gas, the Court appreciated the salience of
Tornillo, that is, it recognized the difference between the speech of a newspaper and
other businesses. The Court noted that Tornillo “rests on the principle that the State
cannot tell a newspaper what it must print.” PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 88 (1980). The Court in PruneYard further noted that the statute in Tornillo
could inhibit public debate by deterring editors from publishing controversial political
statements and quoted the Tornillo Court’s important statement that the statute was an
“‘intrusion into the function of editors.’” Id. (quoting Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). The Court concluded that “[t]hese concerns obviously
are not present here,” id., an observation it could have and should have repeated in
Pacific Gas.
100. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 19.

496

NADER.DOC

[VOL. 41: 483, 2004]

9/10/2019 2:19 PM

The Corporate Conscience
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

effective utility regulation” and “promoting speech by making a variety
of views available to appellant’s customers”—were compelling.101
However, the Court rejected the means chosen to achieve these goals.102
The Court claimed that the state could achieve fair and effective
utility regulation through a means that did not burden PG&E’s First
Amendment rights, by “awarding costs and fees.”103 The Court pronounced
it unproblematic for the state to impose on the appellant the “reasonable
expenses of responsible groups that represent the public interest at
ratemaking proceedings.”104 However, the Court found “‘no substantially
relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the
State’s effort’ to compel appellant to distribute TURN’s speech in
appellant’s envelopes.”105
Unfortunately, the Court maintained silence on the empirical question
at the heart of this analysis—whether alternative mechanisms, such as
imposing costs and fees, would indeed create a fair and effective ratemaking
process.106 What if the insert mechanism was far more effective than
alternatives at capturing the attention of ratepayers?107 Because the
Court ignored this question, its determination of a less restrictive
alternative was empty.108

101. Id. at 19–20.
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 19 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960).
106. See Robert B. Leflar & Martin H. Rogol, Consumer Participation in the
Regulation of Public Utilities: A Model Act, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 235–37 (1976)
(discussing the inadequacy of alternative measures to promote a fairer ratemaking process).
107. This is probably the case, as evidenced by the fact that citizen utility boards
that relied on inserts have not found ample replacements, but the Court apparently
rejected, sub silentio, the judgment of California’s regulative agency that the insert was
the best means to promote a fairer process and richer debate.
108. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (“[C]ourts are not empowered to second-guess the empirical judgments of
lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation.”). Conceding that the state-mandated
insert served its ostensible purpose, the Court rejected it because it was not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to that purpose. This kind of analysis requires courts to “make[] a
primarily empirical judgment about the means.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2419
(1996). However, in Pacific Gas, such an analysis was barely undertaken. It consisted
of two sentences proposing a possible alternative without any consideration of whether
that alternative would be remotely effective. As the Court itself has recognized, the
government need not choose an alternative that “fall[s] short of serving [the] compelling
interests.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).
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The Court was equally cavalier in its treatment of the other state
interest—promoting a richer, more diverse debate.109 The Court stated,
first, that this interest “is not furthered by an order that is not content
neutral.”110 This claim is manifestly false. Before the Commission order,
ratepayers heard only the voice of PG&E; by virtue of the Commission
order, they also heard the contrary voice of TURN. Whether or not one
approves of this means of promoting diverse viewpoints, surely the
Commission order did exactly that.
The Court opined, in addition, that “the State cannot advance some
points of view by burdening the expression of others,”111 but, as we have
seen, the notion that the Commission order burdens the expression of
others requires imputing a “conscience” or “personhood” or “self-realization”
to a commercial utility.112
V. CONTENT NEUTRALITY CONFUSED
As suggested above, the Court found it highly problematic that the
Commission’s order was not content-neutral. The Court observed the
following:
The order does not simply award access to the public at large; rather, it
discriminates on the basis of the viewpoints of the selected speakers. Two of
the acknowledged purposes of the access order are to offer the public a greater
variety of views in appellant’s billing envelope, and to assist groups (such as
TURN) that challenge appellant in the Commission’s ratemaking proceedings in
raising funds. Access to the envelopes thus is not content neutral. The variety
of views that the Commission seeks to foster cannot be obtained by including
speakers whose speech agrees with appellant’s. Similarly, the perceived need to
raise funds to finance participation in ratemaking proceedings exists only where
the relevant groups represent interests that diverge from appellant’s interests.113

This analysis is unconvincing. Government plays favorites all the
time. Practically every piece of legislation favors some groups over others,
and many involve the selective subsidizing of speech.114 Although the
109. It should be noted that, from the standpoint of the consumer movement, citizen
utility boards are not only about resisting rate increases. They are also about
environmental preservation and citizen empowerment. See generally Leflar & Rogol,
supra note 106, at 236–37 (discussing the various functions of a residential utility
consumer action group).
110. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 20.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 12–70 and accompanying text.
113. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 12–13 (citation omitted).
114. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“To hold that the Government
unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a
program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in
advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous
Government programs constitutionally suspect.”); see also FISS, supra note 65, at 46
(1996) (“[S]tate allocations necessarily entail such [content] judgments.”).
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case law is muddled,115 one way to read it is that the doctrine of “content
neutrality,” or prohibition against “viewpoint discrimination,” prevents
the denial of speech based on government disapproval of a particular
message, not the promotion of a certain group’s speech.
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington116 involved a
challenge to an Internal Revenue Code provision exempting from taxation
nonprofit groups that do not engage in lobbying. The plaintiff, a nonprofit
advocacy group that engaged in lobbying, argued that its ineligibility for
the exemption resulted from an impermissible content-based distinction,
but the Court found that Congress simply “chose not to subsidize lobbying
as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that nonprofit
organizations undertake to promote the public welfare.”117 In making
this choice, “Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or
regulated any First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not to
pay for [appellant’s] lobbying.”118 The Court rejected the contention
that “strict scrutiny applies whenever Congress subsidizes some speech,
but not all speech.”119
Appellant also objected to the denial of the exemption coupled with a
separate code provision permitting taxpayers to deduct contributions to
veteran’s groups, though such groups are permitted to lobby. In effect,
Congress had subsidized the lobbying of veterans’ groups, but not other
nonprofit groups. The Court found this differential treatment acceptable,
absent any “indication that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas
or any demonstration that it has had that effect.”120
Likewise, in Buckley v. Valeo,121 the Court upheld a statute establishing
taxpayer funding of presidential campaigns in different amounts depending
on whether the party was “major” or “minor” and providing funds for
political candidates who enter primary campaigns but not those who do
not.122 These measures were permissible because they aimed “not to abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and
115. See Eric J. Cleary, Note, In Finley’s Wake: Forging a Viable First Amendment
Approach to the Government’s Subsidization of the Arts, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 967–68
(1999) (stating that case law on viewpoint discrimination is “unclear and inconsistent”).
116. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
117. Id. at 544.
118. Id. at 546.
119. Id. at 548.
120. Id.
121. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
122. Id. at 87–88, 143–44.
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enlarge public discussion.”123
The Commission order in Pacific Gas would seem to merit the same
treatment as the statutes upheld in these cases. It, too, promoted rather
than restricted speech.124 Though its subsidy was not universal, it
derived from a content-neutral goal. The Court accused the Commission
of a “kind of favoritism,”125 but failed to explain adequately how the
favoritism differed from that in Buckley or Regan. Its effort to distinguish
those cases consisted of a single sentence: “Unlike these permissible
government subsidies of speech, the Commission’s order identifies a
favored speaker ‘based on the identity of the interests that [the speaker]
may represent,’ . . . and forces the speaker’s opponent—not the
taxpaying public—to assist in disseminating the speaker’s message.”126
This two-pronged attempted distinction falls flat. There was no
evidence that the Commission allocated space to TURN based on its
agreement with TURN’s message. Rather, the Commission sought to
promote a fairer ratemaking process and a more balanced presentation of
views. To achieve these objectives, it could only select certain speakers
(just as funding only “major” parties in Buckley, or “nonlobbying”
groups in Regan, involved a selection), but it in no way endorsed the
views of those speakers (any more than Buckley or Regan involved such
an endorsement).127 Again, as in Buckley and Regan, no speech was
suppressed.128
123. Id. at 92–93.
124. Dicta in other cases, both before and after Pacific Gas, further supports the
notion that the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination applies to the suppression
rather than promotion of speech. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1997)
(“There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity
and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.”)
(footnote omitted); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“When Congress established a
National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic
principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing
lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.”) (citation omitted).
125. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986).
126. Id. at 15 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765, 784
(1978)) (alteration in original).
127. Perhaps the case of Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221
(1987), decided after Pacific Gas, may be thought to provide retroactive support for
Pacific Gas. In that case, the Court struck down a state sales tax scheme that exempted
certain kinds of magazines (for example, sports and religious publications). Id. at 223,
233. While the Court held that the scheme was content-based, and therefore subject to
strict scrutiny (which it could not withstand), it made no effort to distinguish Regan. Id.
at 231–33; see id. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Regan was controlling).
The Court may have reached the correct result in any case because it is far from clear
that, given the very weak justifications for the differential tax treatment of different kinds
of magazines, the policy would survive even rational relation review.
128. See id. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The reason that denial of participation in
a tax exemption or other subsidy scheme does not necessarily ‘infringe’ a fundamental
right is that—unlike direct restriction or prohibition—such a denial does not, as a general
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The second point, that opponents in Buckley and Regan were not
forced to disseminate the message in question, involves legerdemain.
The presence of coercion is relevant in connection with the alleged right
not to speak, but here it merely muddles matters. The fact that TURN’s
speech was disseminated in PG&E’s envelope has no bearing on
whether it constituted an impermissible content-based subsidy. The
Court sloppily imported an aspect of one First Amendment doctrine (the
right not to speak) to a separate issue (viewpoint discrimination) for no
apparent reason.
In short, the effort to distinguish Regan and Buckley was unconvincing.
To be sure, in certain contexts the Court has held that the government
may not permit some speakers, but not others, to take advantage of a
public subsidy depending on the viewpoints espoused. In Board of
Regents v. Southworth,129 the Court held that “[w]hen a university
requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of
other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer
some viewpoints to others.”130
In Pacific Gas, unlike Southworth, the government’s goal transcended
an open discussion; it included a fairer ratemaking process. Moreover,
in Pacific Gas, the case was not brought by a party that had been denied
the use of the envelope space.131 Rather, it was brought by a corporation

rule, have any significant coercive effect.”). Justice Scalia proposed, quite reasonably,
an exception “when the subsidy pertains to the expression of a particular viewpoint on a
matter of political concern—a tax exemption, for example, that is expressly available
only to publications that take a particular point of view on a controversial issue of
foreign policy.” Id.; cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515, 528–29 (1958) (holding
unconstitutional a California rule conditioning tax exemption on a statement that one
does not wish to overthrow the government). What was at stake in Pacific Gas was
clearly not the government’s trying to stack the deck in a political debate, but to expose
consumers of a state-regulated utility to information in a way that would make the
ratemaking process fairer and more efficient.
129. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
130. Id. at 233.
131. Indeed, the “Commission reserved the right to grant other groups access to the
envelopes in the future.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 7 (footnote omitted). The
Court noted that the commission had “already denied access to at least one group based
on the content of its speech.” Id. at 7 n.5. However, that group “neither wished to
participate in commission proceedings nor alleged that its use of the billing envelope
space would improve consumer participation in those proceedings.” Id. (citation
omitted). This denial hardly constitutes viewpoint discrimination. To the contrary, it
suggests that the commission based access to envelope space not on viewpoint but on
creating a fairer ratesetting process.
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that, thanks to the largesse of the government,132 fully disseminated its
message.133
The essence of viewpoint discrimination is the government’s endorsement
or rejection of a particular view.134 In Pacific Gas, the government
“placed no limitations on what TURN or appellant could say in the
envelope.”135 It did not know what TURN would say; it knew only that
TURN represented ratepayers, not the utility, and thus figured to provide
a counterweight.136 No one would deny that the state had the authority
to strip PG&E of its monopoly power over the sale of energy. Instead,
the state took the far less intrusive step of reducing PG&E’s control over
the ratesetting process. That, rather than the endorsement of any particular
viewpoint, is what the Commission order was about. As such, it was
very much in the spirit of the First Amendment.137

Id.

132. See Blakely, supra note 58, at 1245–46.
The state is directly connected with the utility bill inserts system. The state
creates the monopolized medium by conferring and protecting a utility’s
monopoly status. This monopoly status enables the utility to utilize at no cost
a comprehensive customer list. . . . An additional subsidy accrues to the utility in
the form of lower postage, materials, labor, and administrative costs.

133. The Southworth Court stated that the analysis would be “altogether different”
if this were a case where the university itself, or its agents, were the speakers, because
“[w]hen the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a
particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate.” 529 U.S. at 235. In
Southworth, the speech in question—students at one university voicing views to fellow
students—was far removed from government. In Pacific Gas, the speech more closely
resembles the situation alluded to in the Court’s dicta. California enhanced the voice of
a speaker in order to promote a fairer governmental process. If the public objects (if it
believes for example, that TURN’s activity distorts rather than enhances the ratemaking
process), it can hold its elected officials, such as those who appoint or confirm
commission members, accountable.
134. See Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that the
“essence of viewpoint-based discrimination” is the state picking among similarly situated
speakers “in order to advance or suppress a particular ideology or outlook.”) (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (characterizing
viewpoint discrimination as that which is “‘intended to discourage one viewpoint and
advance another’”) (quoting Monterey County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. United States
Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1194, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 1987).
135. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 7. The sole exception was that TURN was
required to state that its message was not that of PG&E. Id.
136. See FISS, supra note 65, at 83 (“The state, through regulation, was trying to
enhance the robustness of public debate, not impose an orthodoxy, and had chosen a
means seemingly well fitted to serve that end.”).
137. See City of Madison v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167,
175–76 (1976) (“To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly
in expressing its views . . . is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees.”) (footnote
omitted). Indeed, given the government’s protection of PG&E’s monopoly status, one
could argue that not allowing competing access to the billing envelope is viewpoint
discrimination in favor of PG&E. See Blakely, supra note 58, at 1249–57.
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As one commentator puts it, content neutrality “should not be
reified.”138 It guards against the government deliberately skewing
debate, but should not be applied when the state “is simply acting as a
fair-minded parliamentarian, devoted to having all views presented.”139
VI. RECIPROCITY
As the foregoing suggests, the Court also made an important error of
omission—the failure to recognize the significance of the fact that
PG&E is a state-protected monopoly. One commentator persuasively
argues that utility companies:
even more than corporations in other regulated industries, are granted special
monopoly powers by the state in order to further the public interest. Because of
their monopoly position, they are less like individuals than are nonmonopoly
companies and are more like a branch of the government that granted them
monopoly status. Utility companies should therefore be bound to respect the
dictates of government officials seeking to further the public interest.140

The Court showed no recognition of this principle of reciprocity, or its
corollary that government has special justification, indeed an obligation,
to regulate state-protected monopolies more closely than other businesses.
The latter principle has been recognized by at least some Justices.141
The Court decision seemed premised on “the spectre of government
control of everyone’s speech rights,”142 but the feared slippery slope
would have to be awfully slippery and steep to lead from the Commission
order in Pacific Gas to any truly worrisome government intrusion into
private speech.143 As noted, the order aimed at and was likely to achieve
more speech, without in any way compromising individual freedom.
138. FISS, supra note 65, at 21.
139. Id.
140. The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 46, at 189–90;
see also Blakely, supra note 58, at 1228 (“By lending its authority to the monopoly, the
state is obligated to scrutinize the monopoly’s activities for potential violations of the
public’s interests or the Constitution.”) (footnote omitted).
141. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 550 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.) (“This exceptional grant of power to
private enterprises justifies extensive oversight on the part of the State to protect the
ratepayers from exploitation of the monopoly power through excessive rates and other
forms of overreaching.”).
142. The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 46, at 190.
143. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 169 (1990) (“Judges and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies;
they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom.”).
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The Court’s solicitousness seems even more misplaced when we recognize
that the corporation it protected already enjoyed monopoly status
guaranteed by the state.144 In short, the Court gave protection from the
government to a party that already receives the essential blessings of the
government,145 and struck a blow against the public interest enshrined by
the First Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Any bad First Amendment decision should concern us because of its
potential ramifications beyond its particular context. In this case, the
application of the right of conscience to commercial corporations (to
pick the foremost, but far from the only, error in the Court opinion)
involves far-reaching consequences. The fact that this corporation was a
state-protected monopoly, and that the protection given it undercuts the
state’s effort to promote public debate, only compounds the problem.
Moreover, the Court’s sloppy First Amendment analysis produced a
decision that dealt a severe blow to the consumer movement.146 Such a
movement should rise or fall in the political arena. It should not be
felled by the judicial branch wielding a First Amendment axe with little
precision or dexterity.147

144. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“Any claim it may have had to a sphere of corporate autonomy was largely
surrendered to extensive regulatory authority when it was granted legal monopoly
status.”).
145. State-protected monopolies typically receive not only immunization from
competition, but are also a promised “fair rate of return.” Leflar & Rogol, supra note
106, at 239.
146. This was far from its only negative consequence. See FISS, supra note 65, at
66 (“Although the context seems highly specialized, the significance of Pacific Gas &
Electric for state regulation of the press was immediately recognized.”) Shortly after the
decision, and relying on it in part, the FCC declared its opposition to the fairness
doctrine, which had provided more balanced radio coverage of public issues. Id.
147. See, e.g., Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 362 n.8 (1991) (cautioning against
“judicial policymaking”).
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